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Abstract 
What  is  the  main  limitation  of  much  modern  macro-economic  theory,  among  the 
failings pointed out by William R. White at the 2010 Mayekawa Lecture? We argue that 
the main deficiency is a failure to incorporate the possibility of default, including that of 
banks, into the core of the analysis. With default assumed away, there can be no role for 
financial  intermediaries,  for  financial  disturbances,  or  even  for  money.  Models 
incorporating  defaults  are,  however,  harder  to  construct,  in  part  because  the 
representative agent fiction must be abandoned. Moreover, financial crises are hard to 
predict and to resolve. All of the previously available alternatives for handling failing 
systemically  important  financial  institutions  (SIFIs)  are  problematical.  We  end  by 
discussing a variety of current proposals for improving the resolution of failed SIFIs.   
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I. Introduction 
Last year, my friend and colleague, Bill White, with whom one of us have worked now 
for  more  than  40  years,  first  at  the  Bank  of  England  and  subsequently,  gave  the 
Mayekawa Lecture on the subject of ―Some Alternative Perspectives on Macroeconomic 
Theory  and  Some  Policy  Implications‖  (White  [2010]).  The  lecture  this  year  is 
complementary  to  that  earlier  lecture  and  tries  to  extend  and  to  build  on  it.  Bill 
pointed out several of the main deficiencies of modern theory. 
Let us quote from the opening section of his paper: 
 
[T]he prevailing macroeconomic frameworks simply allowed no room for crises of 
the sort we are currently experiencing. . . . Absent an analytical framework that 
included the possibility of crises and deep economic slumps, it is not surprising 
that the crisis was not commonly anticipated. Nor is it surprising that no policy 
efforts were made to prevent the crisis from happening. 
Moreover, absent any fears of crisis, few ex ante preparations were made to 
help  improve  crisis  management  (e.g.,  adequate  deposit  insurance,  special 
legislation for the insolvency of financial institutions, and so on). Further, ex post 
crisis management was also inadequate in that each stage of the downturn was 
treated as the last, and recovery was constantly said to be imminent. By way of 
example, problems in the banking sector were initially treated as having to do 
with liquidity rather than solvency, and it was generally assumed that traditional 
Keynesian policy responses would suffice to restore full employment. . . . 
It will be contended in this paper that the two workhorses of post-World War 
II  macroeconomics  have  serious  practical  deficiencies.  These  workhorses  are 
referred to here as modern macroeconomics (made up of the New Classical and 
New  Keynesian  models  favored  by  academics)  and  applied  Keynesian  models 
(generally  empirically  estimated  IS/LM  models  of  the  type  still  favored  by 
policymakers and other applied economists). The former models rule out crises 
and  deep  slumps  by  assumption.  The  latter  set  of  models  underestimates  the 
contributions made to deep slumps by developments occurring in the upswing. 
Thus,  they  overestimate  the  capacity  of  Keynesian  policies  to  moderate  deep 
slumps when they do occur. In effect, they also rule out deep slumps, but on the 
basis of the assumption that policy will always work effectively to moderate them. 
Taken  together,  these  points  also  imply  a  greater  need  to  lean  against  the 
upswings of credit cycles rather than to simply try to clean up afterward. 
To remedy these deficiencies, it will be argued here that a new analytical 
synthesis  is  required.  The  building  blocks  of  such  a  synthesis  would  be  an 
increased focus on credit, stocks rather than flows (balance sheets), the possibility 
of stock ―imbalances‖ (in particular excessive levels of debt), and the process of 
transition into crisis. In effect, the work of Keynes needs to be complemented by 2 
 
additional insights from the Austrian School of Economics, and still others from 
the work of Hyman Minsky. 
 
In  our  view,  Bill  White‘s  assessment  of  the  defects  of  current  macroeconomic 
theory is pertinent, but we would not follow his approbation for Austrian theory, at 
least not in general. While we do agree with the praise for Hyman Minsky, we would 
note that neither Hy Minsky nor Bill himself have appeared able to express their 
insights in the form of a well-defined mathematical model. There were no equations, no 
algebra, not even any charts or tables in Bill‘s lecture last year. While this may have 
come as a blessed relief to many of his listeners, and we shall follow his example in this 
respect, such a lack of formalization remains a considerable handicap to having one‘s 
ideas accepted by a profession that has pretensions to being a proper science, and gives 
greater weight to mathematical precision than to empirical realism. 
But above all, we do not think that Bill quite put his finger on what we see as the 
central, crucial deficiency of the standard forms, and mechanisms, of modern macro 
theory. This is their failure to incorporate the concept of default, that is, that borrowers 
of credit may fail fully to repay what they had previously promised, to renege on their 
debt commitments, into their core models. 
As soon becomes obvious, once one tries to include the potentiality for default into 
a macro model, such modeling becomes much harder. Partly as a result, default is 
assumed away in the standard Walrasian models, from which the dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model is directly descended. In the technical jargon, the 
transversality condition implies that all debtors repay all their due debts in full by the 
terminal date of the model. 
But this assumption requires two conditions to hold, both of which are patently 
false. The first is that no debtor fails to repay, even when it is in his own self-interest so 
to do, (i.e., no strategic defaults); that is, that we are maximizing something beyond 
our own utility. The second is that, whatever happens in the future, the debtor will still 
be able to repay. This must logically require complete financial markets, wherein all 
eventualities,  including  Donald  Rumsfeld‘s  famous  ―unknown  unknowns,‖  can  be 
hedged. How can you price and hedge the unknown? Since the number of potential 
future outcomes is infinite, any transaction cost, however minute, would make the 
whole exercise infeasible. 
Nevertheless, Walrasian models, and their modern descendants, are based on this 
fiction  of  perfect  frictionless  financial  markets  (plus  debtors  who  place  honest 
repayment above self-interest, a condition perhaps more nearly realized in Tokyo than 
in London or Athens!). Apart from its obvious lack of realism, such perfect, frictionless 
financial  markets  have  strong  consequential  implications  for  the  structure  of  the 
financial system. 
First, there is no need for financial intermediaries, whereby firms interpose their 3 
 
own  credit  standing  or  credit  analysis  between  the  ultimate  saver  and  ultimate 
borrower, since there is no credit risk. All borrowers—whether the government or a 
noodle-shop  owner,  Governor  Shirakawa,  or  yourself—are  known  with  certainty  to 
have  no  credit  risk  at  all.  All  can  borrow,  or  lend,  in  a  frictionless  world  without 
transaction cost at the risk-less interest rate. So there is no room in such a world for 
banks or money market mutual funds. Moreover, in such a perfect financial system 
where the probability of all future eventualities is assumed to be known, and can be 
hedged  without  transaction  cost,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  room  for  specialist 
insurance companies or pension funds. The complete perfect market will do it all. Our 
core  models  assume  away  the  whole  structure  of  financial  intermediation.  As  Bill 
White correctly emphasized, this is not the mark of an evidence-based science. 
Indeed, in Michael Woodford‘s iconic book, Interest and Prices (Woodford [2003]), 
this implication is accepted and financial intermediaries play no role at all. However, 
whereas  standard  macro  modelers  have  been  willing  to  embrace  the logic  of  their 
assumptions in respect of the absence of any role for financial intermediation (at best, 
a veil), they gag at the further but equally logical step of eliminating money—and 
hence  inflation—from  their  models,  perhaps  because  such  models  have  a  nominal 
interest rate, a Taylor reaction function and inflation (expectations) as key working 
parts. 
It has long been known at the theoretical level that Walrasian (Arrow, Debreu, 
Hahn) models with perfect and complete financial markets have no logical role for 
money. When everyone is risk-less, then anyone‘s IOU can and would be immediately 
and fully acceptable in payment for goods or services. There would still be a need for an 
accounting system (the divine accountant marking to a perfect market) and possibly 
for a numeraire, but not for a special asset category called money. Why need anyone 
hold ―money,‖ when his or her own IOU is entirely acceptable in any exchange? To 
include  ―money‖  in  a  system  with  perfect  financial  markets  in  someone‘s  utility 
function is just a logical error. It is, indeed, the concept of default—that not all debts 
are fully repaid—which gives substance and meaning to the human instruments of 
money, liquidity, banks, and the whole panoply of finance. 
If there ever could be such a frictionless, perfect financial system, could we still 
give meaning to the rate of interest? Yes, of course, but it would be a real rate, affected 
by real factors such as time preference, the marginal efficiency of investment, and so 
on. Could the government then influence it, if other frictions, such as wage and price 
stickiness,  or  other  shocks  such  as  war  or  national  disasters  strike,  causing 
unemployment? 
The  answer  is  yes.  By its  powers  of  taxation,  the  government  can  reduce  the 
private sector‘s current access to consumption, and by increasing its expenditures, it 
could raise present consumption relative to the future. So the government can vary the 
trade-off between present and future goods. Of course, if there were no such frictions 4 
 
(or  shocks),  the private  sector,  assuming  also  that  the  government never  defaults, 
could and would offset the government‘s actions (as Barro [1974] showed long ago). But 
so long as there are real frictions, there can be a fiscal theory of (real) interest rates.1 
Without a clear appreciation of the essential nexus between default and money (or 
liquidity), monetary theory tends to get into a mess. This, for example, is exemplified 
by the attempt to base theories of the evolution, and role, for money on the need to 
minimize transaction costs in markets. But the appropriate counterfactual, at least for 
most purposes, to a monetary economy is  not a barter economy, but a pure credit 
economy.  Moreover,  money—and  credit—developed  over  time  not  so  much  in  the 
context  of  markets  for  goods  and  services,  but  in  the  context  of  social 
inter-relationships. But one of us has already written on this subject at some length in 
his paper on ―The Two Concepts of Money‖ (Goodhart [1998]). And today‘s paper is to 
focus on default, rather than money. 
So, in Section II, we shall discuss ways to model default. It has been, we would 
suggest, the inherent difficulty of doing so that has led most economists to assume it 
away.  Then,  in  Section  III,  we  shall  move  on  to  outline  various  ways  of  trying  to 
forecast an economy in which systemic financial failure is a possibility, though perhaps 
(hopefully) only as a tail risk. In the final section (Section IV), we shall consider a 
variety  of  methods  for  handling,  and  minimizing  the  cost  of,  financial  failure 
(especially of banking failure). 
 
II. Including Default in Macroeconomic Models 
Default is hard to model formally, partly because it is  a discontinuous  variable. A 
company (or other economic agent) is either in default of a commitment, or not. So, 
prior to Martin Shubik‘s original work (Shubik and Wilson [1977]), there was relatively 
little  attempt  to  include  default  in  formal  macroeconomic  models,  although  the 
probability of default has always played a central role in finance. 
Shubik described money as an ―institutionalized symbol of trust,‖ and Kiyotaki 
and Moore (2002) coined a nice phrase, ―Evil is the root of all money.‖ And they are 
correct in this. If everyone always repaid all their debts with certainty, all that would 
be needed to complete a transaction would be a handshake and the acknowledgment 
that the buyer is indebted to the seller. Of course, the good that the seller would like to 
receive at some future date would not necessarily be what the buyer could offer, but 
this discrepancy could easily be resolved in complete financial markets. 
It is, indeed, the possibility of default on contractual obligations that implies the 
necessity  for  the  cash-in-advance  constraints  that  we  employ  in  our  model.  The 
                                                   
1  There can also be real automatic stabilizers. In Egypt, which had not invented money, 
taxation was related to the height of the Nile flood. The higher the flood, the better 
the harvest. So the tax level for the year, payable in grain or labor, was adjusted 
according to the flood gauge. 5 
 
interplay of liquidity and default justifies fiat money, based on the (tax) powers of 
government, as the stipulated mean of exchange. Otherwise, the mere presence of a 
monetary sector without the possibility of endogenous default or any other friction in 
equilibrium  will  become  a  veil  without  affecting  real  trade  and,  eventually,  final 
equilibrium allocations. 
The closest precursor to our present suite of models is the work of Shapley and 
Shubik  (1977)  and  Shubik  (1973,  1999),  who  introduced  a  central  bank  with 
exogenously specified stocks of money and cash-in-advance constraints in a strategic 
market game. The commercial banking sector of our models follows closely Shubik and 
Tsomocos (1992), who used, however, gold-backed money and modeled a mutual bank 
with fractional reserves. Finally, the modeling of money and default in an incomplete 
markets framework is akin to the models developed by Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) 
and Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). However, Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992, 
2003) is a one-period model with money and default, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) 
include incomplete asset markets and money, and Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik 
(2005) have incomplete asset markets, default, and no money. None of the previous 
papers combined all these three ingredients, incorporates a competitive commercial 
banking sector, and focuses on financial fragility. However, Goodhart, Sunirand, and 
Tsomocos (2006a) and Tsomocos (2003a, b) combine all three characteristics. Default is 
modeled as in Shubik (1973) and Shubik and Wilson (1977), namely, by subtracting a 
linear  term  from  the  objective  function  of  the  defaulter  proportional  to  the  debt 
outstanding. 
In these papers, Shubik developed a method whereby default can be incorporated 
into formal models. It runs as follows: the advantage of default is that it enables the 
borrower  not  to  repay  all  that  he  owes.  The  disadvantage  is  that  society  imposes 
certain  costs  on  defaulters,  whether  pecuniary  (lawyers‘  fees,  no  access  to  further 
borrowing, etc.) or non-pecuniary (reputational damage, debtors‘ jail, etc.). If the costs 
of bankruptcy are zero, everyone would default totally and no one would lend. If the 
cost were infinite, no one would borrow. So there must be an interior optimum at which 
the benefits of default just balance its costs. The actual incidence of default then for 
any agent depends on the interaction of the agent‘s preferred strategy interacting with 
the state of the economy, so that when output is low and consumption temporarily 
depressed, the marginal utility of extra consumption (from default) reduces the share 
of the debts that the debtor will pay back, the repayment rate. In other words, default 
(the  inverse  of  the  repayment  rate)  is  always  and  simultaneously  both  strategic, 
dependent on each agent‘s character, and endogenous, dependent on the state of the 
world. 
An implication of this approach is that the mean expected default rate for all 
agents, however low, remains non-zero in almost all states of the world. The expected, 
and ex post actual, repayment rate is rarely 100 percent. Of course, in cases where 6 
 
bankruptcy costs are high, economic conditions are good, and the agent is both risk 
averse and honorable, the repayment rate may rise close to 100 percent. In reverse 
circumstances, the repayment rate may fall sharply. 
Formally,  this  relationship  can  be  described  as  a  constrained  maximization 
problem;  and  the  specification  of  default  can  include  the  idea  (first  introduced  by 
Shubik and Wilson [1977]) that utility decreases monotonically in the level of default 
because it  becomes  more  expensive  to default. In  equilibrium,  agents  equalize  the 
marginal utility of defaulting (i.e., increased consumption) with the marginal disutility 
of  the  bankruptcy  penalty.  Then,  under  rational  expectations,  expected  rates  of 
delivery of repayments of all kinds of debt in all periods and states of nature are equal 
to actual rates of delivery in equilibrium. This concept is the crucial ingredient of the 
model, since it allows default as an equilibrium outcome without necessarily collapsing 
the orderly functioning of the financial system. 
There are some who find the concept of a partial repayment rate objectionable, 
because agents either default, or not (a binary division). But in a sector consisting of 
many small individual units—for example, companies or households—one can think of 
the average repayment rate of the sector as a whole. And where the sector consists of 
one,  or  a  few,  agents—for  example,  government,  oligopolistic  banks  or  car 
companies—even when the agent defaults, most creditors get some partial repayment. 
Thus, the bondholders with claims on Argentina or the Irish banks usually get some 
partial repayment. 
So the Shubik approach, with its assessment of ex ante expected, and its post 
actual, repayment rates is, we claim, realistic. Alternatively, we can model default on 
collateralized  loans.  In  the  initial  period,  agents  finance  their  investment  through 
collateralized borrowing. When they borrow from the collateralized loan markets, they 
pledge the assets purchased as collateral. In the second period, the borrowers either 
deliver in full the amount of the collateralized loan, or default. In the case of default, 
the collateral pledged is foreclosed and is put up for sale in the secondary capital 
market. The receipts are transferred to the banks and determine the effective return 
on the collateralized loan. More involved collateral requirements can be introduced. 
Due to our general equilibrium framework, every contract is priced in equilibrium. 
When equilibrium prices are such that the value of the collateral is higher than the 
nominal value of the loan, the agent will repay fully. When equilibrium prices are such 
that the value of the collateral in the future is less than the amount the agent must 
repay, he would rather default, purchase, for instance, the same amount of capital from 
the secondary market, and be better off. Default is an endogenous decision stemming 
from utility optimization. This process of default, and subsequent fire sale of assets can 
then generate the debt deflation channel whereby monetary policy and money supply 
matter  for  the  determination  of  asset  prices,  such  as  the  interest  rate  on  the 
collateralized loan, and they affect the decision to default and the level of aggregate 7 
 
output (see Lin, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis [2010]). 
The other main problem that this approach engenders is that of dimensionality. At 
the very least models of this kind involve, as an essential component, an additional 
banking sector. If one is concerned with interactions, within the banking sector for 
example, then the requisite number of agents in the model rises much faster. Moreover, 
unless all the agents have prior knowledge of the long-run equilibrium properties of 
the  system,  which  seems  implausible,  the  progress  of  the  system  will  be  path 
dependent. Thus, we show in Bhattacharya et al. (2011) that financial collapses will be 
more extreme after a sequence of good outcomes, since agents will have revised their 
expectations in such a way as to assume more risk. 
The opposite side of the coin, however, is that we can make models of this kind 
quite feasible to explore whichever problem is at hand. Thus, we can use this approach 
to develop a DSGE model in which the only friction is financial, or in which there are 
both wage/price and financial frictions. The initial endeavors, by Curdia and Woodford 
(2009), Leao and Leao (2007), de Walque, Pierrard, and Rouabah (2010), and Iacoviello 
and Neri (2010), which introduced some aspects of financial friction into the DSGE 
framework, have not taken into account simultaneously liquidity, agent heterogeneity, 
money, and default risk. The majority of these models attempt to model default as an 
out-of-equilibrium phenomenon that never occurs in equilibrium. Nevertheless, these 
models are valuable efforts toward a plausible explanation of the phenomena observed 
during and after the credit crisis. One paper that attempts to achieve this synthesis is 
Martinez and Tsomocos (2011). 
One of the crucial elements remaining to be introduced into the DSGE framework 
is the liquidity constraint the agents face, because goods are not fully readily tradable 
for other goods. Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011) 
and  Acharya  and  Viswanathan  (2011),  Brunnermeier  and  Pedersen  (2009),  and 
Vayanos (2004) have all studied liquidity within partial equilibrium models. In our 
models, liquidity will be modeled following Espinoza and Tsomocos (2008). Such an 
extension to the dynamic framework will be a direct and useful tool to assess the 
impact of the financial and real shocks, since it has two important advantages. The 
first is the ability to monitor the impact of a liquidity shock in the short, but also 
medium,  run.  The  second  is  that  the  dynamic  setting  allows  us  to  parameterize 
different liquidity environments (i.e., steady-state values) and examine how shocks 
impact the economic variables in each case. 
Perhaps the main purpose of our program of work has been to develop models that 
might  be  used  to  explore  financial  stability.  Thus,  our  earlier  models  focused  on 
interactions  within  the  banking  sector.  In  particular,  Goodhart,  Sunirand,  and 
Tsomocos (2006b) and Tsomocos (2003a, b) set out a tractable model that illuminates 
problems  relating  to  individual  bank  behavior,  to  possible  contagious 
inter-relationships  between  banks,  and  to  the  appropriate  design  of  prudential 8 
 
requirements and incentives to limit “excessive‖ risk-taking. Our model is rich enough 
to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and 
credit and deposit markets. Yet it is simple enough to be effectively computable and 
can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyze financial fragility. Financial 
fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other 
results, a nontrivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia 
co-determine  interest  rates,  and  both  regulatory  and  monetary  policies  have 
nonneutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial 
fragility,  thus  highlighting  the  tradeoff  between  financial  stability  and  economic 
efficiency.  Other  papers,  using  this—or  a  closely  similar—model,  mostly  developed 
within  central  banks,  include  Saade,  Osorio,  and  Estrada  (2007)  and  Goodhart, 
Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006b). 
Given  the  importance  of  the  boom/bust  cycle  in  the  property  market,  both 
residential and commercial, we have developed models to explore and to simulate such 
crises. Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis (2010) build on our previous model of a 
system in which default plays a central role for both borrowers and banks, and in 
which financial intermediation and money, therefore, have a necessary real function, to 
include both an additional good—housing—in addition to the prior composite basket of 
other  goods  and  services,  and  an  additional  agent—a  new  entrant  to  the  housing 
market. So our model is general enough to allow for the examination of a wide variety 
of shocks, which can lead to financial instability. 
 
III. Default and Forecasting 
A. Extrapolating the Past 
Our past history is all that we (partially)2  know. From this we can extract trends, for 
example, of output, productivity, monetary growth, velocity, inflation, and so on. Given 
such trends, the actual time series exhibit cycles, of varying periodicity, around the 
trend. One of the strongest maintained assumptions in economics is that the system 
has an equilibrium (rate of growth), to which the economy would revert in the longer 
run, in the absence of future shocks (including defaults and financial shocks). DSGE 
models  are  in  general  constructed  around  a  strong  assumption  of  reversion  to  an 
equilibrium (Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2011]). 
At any time, however, the economic system is out of equilibrium, and is at some 
stage of a cycle, with its own autoregressive momentum. Thus, stripped of its detail, 
most  economic  forecasting  represents  a  balance  between  the  centrifugal  forces  of 
ongoing cyclical momentum and the  centripetal forces of reversion  to the  long-run 
                                                   
2  The downgrading of the teaching of economic history from its prior role as part of the 
core curriculum of an economics degree to a lesser status as an inessential 
specialization has meant that most economists know even less of their past history 
than previously. 9 
 
equilibrium. In practice, most forecasters are poor at predicting cyclical turning points. 
Hence  they  tend  to  predict  some  fairly  constant  combination  of  autoregressive 
momentum and reversion to the mean. As a result, so long as the up phase of a cycle 
continues, forecasters tend to underestimate outcomes, and vice versa in the down 
phase. This gives rise to a common pattern of outcomes and predictions looking like 
Figure 1; see Goodhart and Lim (2011). 
While  many  of  the  shocks  giving  rise  to  this  pattern  are  real—for  example, 
technology,  productivity,  and  supply  shocks—some  are  financial.  The  most  serious 
financial shocks are those that occur after periods of strong and stable growth, with 
increasing optimism about declining volatility and lower risks. Explanations of this 
syndrome  are  given  by  Minsky  (e.g.,  Minsky  [1982,  1992])  and  modeled  by 
Bhattacharya  et  al.  (2011).  Examples  are  the  United  States  (1929),  Japan  (1990), 
Southeast Asia (1997), and the developed economies (2007–08). After such a financial 
shock, there is generally a longish period of stagnant credit expansion and slow growth 
(Reinhart and Rogoff [2009]). 
The  financial  crisis  leads  to  a  regulatory  response,  to  tighten  up,  and  more 
government intervention in the operation of the financial system. Some, for example, 
Congdon (2009, 2010, 2011), argue that such intervention and tightened regulatory 
requirements are themselves a cause of the resultant slower growth of money, credit, 
and output. Be that as it may, the new and reinforced regulatory controls, following the 
Great Depression of 1929–33, then ushered in a long period from the 1930s to the 
1960s that was characterized by constrained, repressed banking, but which was free of 
banking/financial crises. 
Although the crises in the early 1970s were in some countries associated with 
financial  liberalization—for  example,  the  United  Kingdom—the  main  blame  was 
placed on poor government policies (e.g., incomes policies) and (oil) supply shocks. So 
despite a number of other episodes of financial stress (the less-developed-country crisis 
of 1981–82, involving Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil; the housing/European exchange 
rate mechanism [ERM] crisis of 1991–92; and the Southeast Asian/Long-Term Capital 
Management crisis of 1997–98), the process whereby further and extended financial 
liberalization and globalization coincided with increasing official success in achieving 
low and stable inflation and steady growth, the ―Great Moderation,‖ continued until 
punctuated by the financial crisis of 2007–08. 
If one calls this period from the 1929 crisis until the 2008 crisis a single super-cycle, 
then we have really only had one such episode. This is far too small to extrapolate into 
the future. But perhaps the example of Japan, whose own idiosyncratic crisis occurred 
much earlier in the 1990s, gives a warning that developed economies more generally 
may now be prone to a period of much slower growth both of the monetary aggregates 
and of output. How far such slower growth in money and credit is responsible for, and 
how far it is simply caused by, the slower growth in demand and output is not easy to 10 
 
discern. 
The adoption of unconventional monetary policy measures—notably, quantitative 
easing (QE)—has been an attempt to reinvigorate monetary expansion. Insofar as this 
was  expected  to  run  via  injections  of  base  money,  through  the  traditional  money 
multiplier to the broader monetary aggregates, it was, however, a dramatic example of 
the effect of Goodhart‘s law. Insofar, however, as it was expected to run via enhanced 
liquidity (and money balances) into asset prices more generally and into a recovery of 
certain dysfunctional financial markets, it has been quite successful, though exactly 
how successful remains a contentious and contested subject. 
Clearly  the  virulence  of  the  current  boom/bust  cycle,  both  in  Japan  and  more 
recently in  developed economies, owes  much to the interaction  of the housing and 
financial cycles. Standard DSGE models incorporate neither sector. We have tried to 
incorporate both, notably in our 2010 paper with Vardoulakis, already cited. Be that as 
it may, a policy response that focuses almost entirely on the monetary side and fails to 
deal with the continuing downward pressures on housing and land prices, for example, 
from  foreclosures,  is  likely  to  be  lopsided  and  only  partially  effective.  Surely  it  is 
difficult to design a satisfactory policy to cope with mortgage default and consequential 
foreclosures, but the failure to do so has been a millstone holding down recovery in the 
United States and Japan. Looking again at the set of policies for housing, including 
importantly the bankruptcy provisions  and ―skin  in  the  game‖ loan-to-value (LTV) 
requirements, remains a key element of unfinished business. 
Equally  the  nexus  between  additional  financial  regulation  and  the  pace  of 
monetary and credit expansion remains a highly contentious issue. Many economists 
(Admati et al. [2011], Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano [2011], and Barrell et al. [2010]) 
and  regulators  (Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  [2010a,  b])  believe  that 
tougher  capital  and  liquidity  requirements,  so  long  as  these  are  introduced  quite 
gradually, will only have minor effects on interest rate spreads, and hence on credit 
and monetary aggregates. A few economists (Congdon again) and many in the industry 
contest this (Institute of International Finance [2010]) claiming that the effect already 
has been, is, and will be significant and damaging to recovery. 
In  our  view,  a  crucial  issue  is  the  way  that  such  tougher  requirements  are 
introduced. If banks are given a target for the absolute value of core tier 1 equity, based 
on  their  current  total  value  of  assets/liabilities,  to  prevent  them  from  achieving  a 
required ratio by delevering further, and if that target value of capital is enforced by 
dividend restrictions, and maybe bonus restrictions, until it is reached, then it could be 
met without adverse effects on the real economy. The continued proclivity of banks to 
pay  out  dividends  and  bonuses  after  the  crisis  struck  in  August  2007  and  the 
premature relaxation on U.S. dividend payments in March 2011 should not have been 
allowed to occur. On this, see Acharya et al. and Goodhart et al. (2010). 
Nevertheless,  what  is  clear  is  that  now  that  we  in  developed  economies  have 11 
 
entered the post-crisis (bust) stage, we still do not have much ability to forecast how 
the financial sector will respond to tougher regulation, and/or how developments in the 
financial sector will influence the real economy. We simply do not have the models to do 
so. Of course, a few diehard adherents of the previously mainstream DSGE models, 
without housing or finance sectors, may claim that none of this matters, that the only 
shocks are real, but it is hard to take such protestations seriously. 
But policymakers, and most outside commentators, are not so much concerned 
with forecasting in the depressed, recovery stage (though they should be, since that is 
where  we  are  now),  as  with  the  more  high-colored  (sexier)  question  of  whether 
economists can provide an ―early warning system‖ (EWS) to predict, and so perhaps to 
forestall,  the  advent  of  both  systemic  crises  and  of  idiosyncratic  individual  bank 
failures. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
B. Can Crises Be Forecast? 
The first international banking problems since the interwar period surfaced in 1974, 
(Herstatt,  Franklin  National  Bank,  and  fears  about  the  recycling  of  petrodollars). 
Immediately thereafter, the Group of Ten (G10) central bank governors at the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) meetings and finance ministers called for an EWS to 
anticipate such crises in the future. Indeed, it was largely for the purpose of providing 
such an EWS that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was set up 
initially in 1974–75 (Goodhart [2011]). Fortunately, since attempts to estimate such an 
EWS  have  been  of  strictly  limited  success  throughout,  the  BCBS  soon  turned  its 
attention  instead  to  the  somewhat  more  amenable  subject  of  international, 
cross-border, bank regulation and supervision. 
It is not perhaps surprising that the Lehman failure caught everyone by surprise. 
After the handling of Bear Stearns and of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury, the general assumption had been that these authorities 
would  find  some  way  to  keep  Lehman  Brothers,  and  the  other  broker/dealer 
investment houses, in continuing operation. Indeed, it was partly the shock to such 
prior expectations, and the resultant uncertainty about how the U.S. authorities might 
act from then on, that caused the crisis to become so sharp and abrupt (see Taylor 
[2009]). 
Nevertheless, there are intrinsic reasons to doubt whether a really successful EWS 
can ever be developed. As implied by the Lucas critique (and Goodhart‘s law), if such a 
warning system ever appeared to have predictive power, then agents‘ behavior would 
change, and the crisis would be averted, one way or another. The best that we can hope 
to achieve is a greater appreciation of the conditions of stress that may foster a crisis. 
Several of these are known already. They include credit expansion, leverage, housing 
and property price inflation, and output growth, which are both rapid and above trend. 
The crisis will also probably be worse when it is preceded by a current account deficit 12 
 
(Barrell et al. [2010] and Reinhart and Rogoff [2009]). There is also evidence that 
periods in which the risk of a collapse (recovery)—as assessed by tail risk in asset 
returns—is seen as higher than the opposite, but asset prices continue rising, herald a 
sharp reversal (Cascon, Shadwick, and Shadwick [2011]). 
As is fairly obvious, almost all the signs of potential stress are equivalently signs of 
an asset price boom. In a boom, almost everyone is making money and is optimistic. 
Only the Cassandras and the doomsayers will have lost money. The precept of ―buy on 
the dips‖ will have led to fortune. Nobody can ever regularly predict either a turning 
point or a change in trend. In this respect, macroeconomics has something in common 
with seismology. There are always many who predict a continuing faster expansion: 
“it is different this time,‖ ―the end of boom and bust,‖ ―Dow 40,000,‖ and so on. Indeed, 
during the course of such a boom, the most accurate forecasters will be those who have 
been  generally  most  optimistic.  It  is  difficult  not  to  get  caught  up  in  the  general 
enthusiasm; indeed as Frankel and Froot (1986, 1987) showed, the boom (bust) only 
collapses once all the uncertain investors have finally jumped on the bandwagon. 
Asset  price  booms  and  busts  are  market  phenomena.  The  market  itself  by 
definition cannot, and does not, predict its own crisis and reversal. Credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads were never lower, and bank equity prices never much higher, than in 
June  2007.  Within  a  cyclical  phase  the  market  can  predict  quite  well  which 
company/bank will do best/worst, but the market gives little or no guidance about 
future macro-developments, or of its own sharp reversals. 
Even if central bankers should manage to maintain their scepticism about asset 
price bubbles (―irrational exuberance‖), they would face intense (political) opposition if 
they were to try to take measures to counter such a boom. ―Taking away the punch 
bowl just when the party gets going‖ will not endear one to the guests. Given all the 
other difficulties of using countercyclical measures to halt an asset price boom, leaving 
this just to the discretion of central banks is likely to result in them being underused. 
We have, however, made this point in other papers. 
Besides the repeated call, never effectively answered or answerable, for an EWS, 
the other persistent nostrum of regulators seeking to forestall crisis is for stress tests. 
These also are of very limited use. We are confident that had regulators applied a 
stress test in June 2007 on the assumption of a decline in U.S. housing prices by June 
2009 of 20 percent (five times the maximum expected by econometric exercises and 
which would then have been dismissed as totally implausible), not a single U.S. or 
European bank would have appeared in any serious danger. Recall how the Irish banks 
passed the European stress tests. 
There  are  several  inherent  problems  with  stress  tests.  The  first  is  that  the 
regulators may be unwilling even to contemplate the most serious risk events, for 
instance, the default of a sovereign debtor. A second is that the regulators running the 
stress test need to have a convincing backstop policy in place to restore any bank, or 13 
 
other financial intermediary, to reasonable health should it fail the test before the 
stress test is applied. Otherwise, there would be growing doubts whether either a bank 
(or  other  financial  institution)  or  the  regulators  themselves  would  be  prepared  to 
announce such a test failure. Such a backstop (provided by the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program  [TARP])  was  in  place  in  the  successful  U.S.  stress  test,  but  not  in  the 
unsuccessful European test. 
But the most important deficiency of any stress test is that it explores the effect of 
some  exogenous,  macroeconomic  shock  on  an  individual  bank.  It  does  not,  and  in 
practice cannot, examine the endogenous  risk to the system as a whole, as banks 
themselves react to the worsened situation by delevering, restricting (interbank) loans, 
requiring more collateral from counterparties, selling assets, and hoarding liquidity. 
There are multiple sets of self-reinforcing spiral effects that drive financial bubbles 
and busts (Brunnermeier et al. [2009]), and stress tests on individual banks will not 
reveal these. 
This is not to suggest that such stress tests are a waste of time. They may be able 
to indicate comparative weakness, that is, which banks would be seen as most at risk 
from  some  exogenous  event.  But  they  are  not  of  much  value  as  a  guide  to  the 
probability of a systemic crisis. It is our view that the individual bank stress tests need 
to be complemented by top-down, model-based simulations of the banking (financial) 
system as a whole. One of the purposes of our work in building models in which banks 
and default play a central role is precisely to provide a basis for carrying out such 
simulations. We would not expect such models to be able to predict—to forecast—the 
actual  occasion  and  initial  cause  of  the  crisis  itself,  any  more  than  any  other 
(reduced-form) EWS, but they might be able to estimate both the fragility of the system 
to such a crisis, for example, as risk-aversion coefficients could be assumed to alter and 
also perhaps to chart the likely further direction of the crisis once it was underway. 
This  latter  consideration  leads  to  the  question  of  how  to  assess  the  likely 
interaction of the financial system with the real economy, once a financial crisis has 
begun. 
 
C. Forecasting Procedures after the Crisis Has Begun 
A cyclical downturn that has been triggered by a financial crisis is likely to differ, in 
several respects, from a downturn caused by other factors, for example, official action 
to  counter  inflation  (Reinhart  and  Rogoff  [2009,  2011]  and  Reinhart  [2011]).  The 
supply of credit to marginal borrowers at least, and monetary growth, will be cut back. 
Spreads  between  such  government  debt  as  is  perceived  to  remain  riskless  and  on 
riskier assets are likely to widen. 
Indeed,  the  simplest  and  most  straightforward  way  to  incorporate  financial 
difficulties  into  a  forecast  for  the  real  economy  is  just  to  substitute  a  risk-spread 
adjusted  interest  rate,  in  place  of  the  official  rate,  into  the  model‘s  domestic 14 
 
expenditure function(s), and then proceed as before. This is in effect the proposal of 
Curdia and Woodford (2009), and it has much to recommend it (also see Gilchrist and 
Zakrajsek [2011]). 
There are, as always, problems. Exactly which risk spread should be used? Is the 
effect on expenditures of a rise in official rates of 1 percent more or less equal to a rise 
in the risk spread of 1 percent (official rates remaining constant)? We can think of 
arguments why the effect of the latter (risk spread rise) might be greater (additional 
non-price rationing of credit) or less (not so pervasive; less effect on confidence and 
expectations perhaps) than a rise in the official rate. We are not currently aware of any 
conclusive econometric tests on this issue. 
But the main problem with this approach is that the risk spread is treated as an 
exogenous  variable,  rather  than  being  derived  endogenously  from  the  optimizing 
behavior of agents. Moreover, the forecast will have to contain some estimate of the 
future  path  of  the  risk spread  itself.  Of  course,  this  too  can  be  provided  by  some 
auxiliary  model.  It  could  be  univariate;  thus,  after  an  (unforeseeable)  shock,  risk 
spreads tend to revert asymptotically to the low, long-run equilibrium, unless distorted 
by some further shock. Or one could run a reduced-form equation, relating the spread 
to  factors  such  as  failure  rates,  expected  bank  profitability  and  capital  ratios,  the 
increase in base money, and so on. Some might ask why not relate risk spreads to 
market variables such as option and CDS prices; but such market pricing variables are 
in a sense just another facet of the same market factor. 
Ideally, we would like to be able to forecast risk spreads as one of the outputs of our 
more general equilibrium financial model, in which default plays a central role. But for 
the time being, this is beyond our capabilities. Nevertheless, this can only be achieved 
within  a  model  of  liquidity  and  endogenous  default  whereby  spreads  emerge  in 
equilibrium  and,  hence,  can  be  calibrated  and  used  for  policy  determination  and 
regulatory  purposes.  At  the  same  time,  financial  stability  measures  should  be 
constructed  that  can  be  easily  implemented  and  used  contemporaneously  with 
inflation targeting to assess monetary and financial stability policy. 
 
IV. How to Handle the Default of a Global SIFI 
Few events have more destructive power than the default of a global systemically 
important financial institution (G-SIFI), especially if badly handled, as in the case of 
the failure of Lehman Brothers. Not only is there a major loss of value, following the 
event of default, to creditors and/or taxpayers, but much more important, the blow to 
confidence and the subsequent effect on market prices can have an impact on the real 
economy that is a large multiple of the direct loss from the initial failure. The failures 
of Lehman Brothers, of Credit-Anstalt, and of the Knickerbocker Trust Company in 
1907 are examples. The extension of credit, and the working of the financial system, 
are based in some large part on trust and confidence, and—should that trust suddenly 15 
 
evaporate—the  inner  fragility  of  the  capitalist  system  is  revealed.  This  can  be 
terrifying.   
And for the creditors of the failing bank, the occasion of bankruptcy will tend of 
itself  to  destroy  value.  We  understand  (from  personal  conversation)  that,  at  the 
weekend which settled the fate of Lehman Brothers, the assessed shortfall of value, 
once equity had been wiped out, was somewhere in the region of US$25 billion. But 
after the bankruptcy had occurred, the eventual shortfall was around three times as 
large (or more). What makes default such an expensive exercise? First, the generalized 
shock of the event and the expectation of forced fire sales will cause the value of the 
assets held by the bank to decline; with no ongoing reputational ties to maintain, 
debtors to the bank will seek ways to delay or to diminish their repaying commitments; 
the  specialized  personal  knowledge  of  the  bank  employees  suddenly  loses  value 
(goodwill disappears), and the bankruptcy procedure itself is extremely expensive and 
time consuming.   
So creditors of SIFIs, especially bondholders, often would have a common interest 
in providing more equity capital up front to rescue the failing SIFI rather than allow it 
to default. There is, however, a major coordination problem to overcome in arranging 
this. It is the purpose of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds and of bail-in procedures 
for bondholders to try to overcome this coordination problem. But this is to run ahead 
of the currently unfolding story, since neither CoCos nor bail-in arrangements are yet 
in general widespread use. 
Instead at present, when faced with the default of a bank or SIFI, the authorities 
have only had three alternatives: 
(1)  Try  to  arrange  a  merger  with  a  stronger  financial  institution,  sometimes 
sweetened by some (overt or covert) subsidy. 
(2) Rescue the bank using taxpayers‘ money. 
(3) Allow it to go bankrupt and be liquidated. 
All these alternatives have major disadvantages. The encouraged merger route 
increases  concentration,  reduces  competition,  may  involve  the  outlay  of  taxpayers‘ 
moneys (and/or can involve risky central bank loans), and may create a much larger 
weak bank, where formerly the absorbing bank was much healthier. The encouraged 
mergers of Bear Stearns (into JPMorgan Chase), HBOS (into Lloyds TSB), and Merrill 
Lynch  (into  Bank  of  America)  each  illustrate  some  of  these  disadvantages. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  throes  of  a  crisis  this  is  often  the  preferred  solution  for  the 
authorities. 
When this solution became unavailable, the choice lies between propping up the 
failing bank with taxpayers‘ money or liquidating it. The experience of the failure of 
Lehman Brothers was so appalling that most governments thereafter decided that 
liquidation of an SIFI could not be tolerated. So they moved rapidly to the use of 
taxpayers‘ moneys to recapitalize failing banks. The problem with this was that it has 16 
 
often turned out to be too expensive for the public sector to sustain, ―too big to save‖ as 
in  Ireland,  and  the  political  consequences  of  imposing  austerity  on  taxpayers  and 
public-sector  employees  to  save  banks  and  bankers—who  are  perceived  to  have 
behaved badly—have become insupportable. So this route has, in many respects, also 
reached its limits. 
Since none of the current alternatives for handling failing SIFIs are acceptable, or 
are capable of much further utilization, the search is on for other methods for handling 
their default. We shall discuss three here; though they are separable, they are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive: 
(1) Improve the liquidation process. 
(2) Make the bondholder liable, via CoCos and bail-ins. 
(3) Reform Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). 
The first alternative, as largely adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act, involves four main 
elements. 
(a) Enactment of a Special Resolution Regime enabling the authorities to take over 
and manage the running of a bank prior to actual bankruptcy, to split it into a 
good bank/bad bank, and so on, as soon as its supervisors come to the view that 
its normal operations are no longer sustainable. This can be well before it is 
formally bankrupt. 
(b)  The  requirement  for  all  SIFIs  that  they  complete  ―living  wills‖  to  the 
satisfaction  of  their  supervisors.  This  should  include  both  a  crisis  recovery 
component and a funeral plan, should the recovery fail (Huertas [2010a, b]). 
The funeral plan should enable the authorities to have the capacity to know in 
advance how to close down this SIFI expeditiously and efficiently. 
(c) An orderly liquidation process, ready to be put in place. 
(d) A fund, to be provided ex ante, or ex post, by the remaining banks to meet the 
residual cost of the liquidation. 
Much of this program, especially (a) and (b), is admirable, but we doubt whether it 
will work effectively for the following reasons. On (a), assessing when a bank has 
gotten into an unsustainable state is extremely difficult, and will be contested by the 
bank‘s owners and equity holders. Given the threat of a lawsuit, if such closure is to be 
left to the discretion of the supervisors, it will come too late. On (b), the procedure for 
completing and updating ―living wills‖ is, we expect, likely to be so time-consuming 
and  expensive  for  both  the  regulator  and  the  regulated  that  it  will  be  done  only 
occasionally and less thoroughly and completely than would in principle be ideal. On 
(c), the main problem is that G-SIFIs are by definition cross-border (indeed most SIFIs 
are), and the institutional structure for organizing an orderly cross-border liquidation 
is  nonexistent  (Avgouleas,  Goodhart,  and  Schoenmaker  [2010],  Goodhart  and 
Schoenmaker [2009], and Claessens, Herring, and Schoenmaker [2010]). Much of the 
disaster attending the Lehman failure arose not from the treatment of the U.S. part of 17 
 
the firm, but from the chaos that occurred with the liquidation of Lehman Brothers 
(Europe) in London and Lehman Brothers (Asia) in Tokyo. On (d), no one knows the 
correct premium (tax rate) to charge ex ante, and the banks will fight the proposal. On 
the other hand, charging the better-run banks, which did not fail, ex post just when the 
banking  system  as  a  whole  is  much  weaker  would  be  misguided  (though  this  is 
proposed  by  Dodd-Frank!).  For  additional  criticisms  of  the  Dodd-Frank  Act,  see 
Acharya et al. (2010). This is not to say that such a process of orderly liquidation 
cannot work, nor that answers to these objections cannot be attempted; rather, the 
claim made here is that the concept of an “orderly‖ liquidation process remains highly 
problematical. 
In contrast to the Americans, the Europeans now appear much keener on option 
(2), making the bondholder pay, whereas the Americans seem somewhat more sceptical. 
There are two versions, CoCos and bail-ins. With the CoCo, a bond is issued that 
automatically  transforms  into  equity  when  a  preordained  trigger  is  met,  with  a 
conversion factor that is also settled in advance. The optimal form of both settings is 
quite complex to decide. In our view, the best approach would be a market price of 
equity  (maintained  over  some  20  working  days  to  avoid  flash  crash  and  sudden 
manipulation problems) that was quite high above the failure level and converted at a 
rate which diluted existing equity sufficiently to encourage existing equity holders to 
recapitalize themselves via a new issue, rather than allow the trigger to come into 
action. 
Bail-ins are mechanisms to require the bondholder to recapitalize the bank when it 
approaches the point of failure. They can come in two versions, contractual or statutory. 
With the contractual version, the extent of requirement for the bondholder to meet the 
residual costs of the failure (after the bank reaches the near point of failure) is set out 
in  advance  in  the  prospectus  and  documentation  (and  is  thereby  limited).  In  this 
respect, it is akin to a CoCo with a very low (zero equity price) trigger. 
With a statutory bail-in, the government assesses the residual loss to be met, plus 
the need for recapitalization, and then allocates the required burden across the various 
categories of bondholder in order from the most junior to the most senior. To avoid 
uncertainty,  the  principles  to  be  followed  would  have  to  be  clearly  and  publicly 
established  in  advance,  probably  incorporated  into  legislation  since  it  involves  the 
authorities encroaching on private property rights. 
The newfound enthusiasm for imposing (some significant part of) the cost of failure 
on the bondholder extends beyond bank bondholders to holders of government bonds. 
All member countries of the eurozone are to include collective action clauses (CACs) 
into their sovereign bonds from 2013 onward. The idea is that CAC bonds will be 
considerably easier to restructure, that is, to impose  a partial default, than bonds 
without such clauses. 
In view of the disadvantages of the other methods for handling failing banks, one 18 
 
can see why this proposed alternative has been greeted, so warmly, at least in Europe. 
But it too has numerous problems. For example, poorly chosen settings for CoCos could 
make fragility worse rather than improve it. Next, if the authorities were to allow 
other banks or levered financial intermediaries to hold CoCos or bank bonds subject to 
bail-in, the potentiality for contagion and falling rows of dominoes is obvious. So if the 
holders are to be restricted to pension, hedge, and sovereign wealth funds or insurance 
companies, then the market could be rather thin. Moreover, the ultimate beneficiaries 
of such intermediated funds are much the same set of people as taxpayers. It is not 
necessarily  clear  that  switching  the  burden  of  preventing  liquidation  from  the 
taxpayer to the fund beneficiary will be politically much more palatable. It may seem 
so in advance when few such imposed losses of value have yet been suffered, but it may 
look quite different after the event. 
But the most serious problem, in our view, is that of contagion, and the danger of 
making a crisis worse rather than better. Too often, the pros and cons of schemes like 
CoCos and bail-ins are discussed in the context of a single failing SIFI rather from the 
standpoint  of  the  system  as  a  whole.  In  general,  a  well-designed  CoCo  or  bail-in 
mechanism does have much to recommend it in the context of a single failing bank (or 
eurozone government). 
But  the  systemic  problems  could  be  acute.  The  failure  of  a  single  financial 
intermediary,  even  quite  a  large  one  (e.g.,  the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce 
International  or  Barings),  is  not  that  serious  a  problem  if  its  cause  was  clearly 
idiosyncratic, sui generis. Most severe crises, however, are caused by common shocks. 
So if a CoCo or a bail-in gets triggered for one bank, it will raise the likelihood of it 
taking place at other banks. But no one will be sure of what the probability might be. 
So hedging on CDS and short sales would increase. Moreover, the cost of issuing new 
CoCos  and  bail-in  bonds  for  other  banks  subject  to  the  common  shock  would  rise 
sharply. So long as senior bondholders thought that they would not be subject to loss in 
the  event  of  a  default,  then  banks  (and  eurozone  governments)  could  refinance 
themselves in the markets, even if they were under some suspicion. In the aftermath of 
the 2007–08 crisis, many banks resorted to debt issues to meet their funding needs. 
Would they have been able to do so, and at what price, if the bonds to be issued were 
subject to bail-in? 
Markets can dry up and become dysfunctional when faced with the prospect of 
uncertain  loss.  Do  we  really  want  that  to  happen  for  the  bank  (and  eurozone 
government) bond markets? The authorities could perhaps respond in the face of a 
generalized  crisis  by  making  the  bonds  issued  during  the  duration  of  the  crisis 
guaranteed against loss. But unless the world were lucky, the proportion of bail-in 
bonds then might be so small that the loss imposed on them for recapitalization would 
have to be large, perhaps so large as to sully the reputation of the asset category for a 
long time. 19 
 
A  besetting  weakness  of  our  regulatory  approach  has  always  been  that  it  has 
focused on resolving the problems of the individual bank, rather than those of the 
wider financial system. We are concerned that the move toward requiring banks to 
issue CoCos and bail-in bonds may have the same flaw. 
In our view, the conceptually best approach to dealing with banking fragility that 
has been tried was to impose a regime of PCA, as set out under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. This not only set out a 
carefully considered and graduated ladder of sanctions as tier 1 capital fell below a 
fully adequate leverage ratio, but also required banks either to recapitalize or be closed 
when their leverage ratio fell below 2 percent, with the aim of never leaving a loss that 
other parties, for example, taxpayers or bondholders, would have to bear. 
Yet this failed in 2008. Banks that failed generally had accounting capital, at their 
final audit, not only over the 2 percent limit but even on average higher than the 
comparable banks that did not fail (Haldane [2011]). Losses were recorded by the FDIC 
in resolving these failing banks. The approach was right, but the practice was deficient. 
As has now been frequently pointed out (Calomiris [2011]), market equity prices gave a 
much better guide to future failure than tier 1 accounting data. The latter involve some 
considerable delay (lags) and can be manipulated. 
Simply switching from an accounting measure to a market measure for a leverage 
ratio would, however, lead to other problems. Market prices can to some extent be 
manipulated, and the use of a market measure would feed the hysteria about short 
sales. Then there is the problem of a flash crash; while if one responded to it by making 
the market price trigger depend on averaging over a certain number of days, how 
would the averaging be done? It could lead to a ―sword of Damocles‖ effect on the bank 
involved, and attempts at end-period manipulation. 
Perhaps the best option would be to use a combination of both accounting and 
market price triggers, with a considerably higher accounting ratio, say 4 percent for a 
tangible  core  equity  leverage  ratio  from  the  accounting  measure  and  a  2  percent 
tangible common equity (TCE) leverage ratio using market prices, averaged over two 
days. Both would have to be broken simultaneously to force PCA. 
Under the FDICIA, a bank that fell below 2 percent would either be recapitalized 
or liquidated. In view of the costs of liquidation, we would propose that the bank either 
be recapitalized, or taken over by the government. One of the errors of handling the 
recent crisis was that political ideology prevented the government in either the United 
States  or  the  United  Kingdom  from  taking  failing  banks  into  temporary  public 
ownership. Fear of the word ―nationalization‖ was too great. But when banks get into 
such  straits, not only should the management team and the board of directors  be 
removed, but also existing shareholders should be expropriated. As soon as practically 
possible, the bank should be sold back to the private sector. If the receipts from such 
sales exceed the government‘s costs and a reasonable rate of return on the interim 20 
 
investment of public-sector money, then the excess could be distributed to the prior 
shareholders. 
A  reformed  and  improved  PCA  mechanism  should  be  able  to  cope  with  most 
banking problems, and a combination of living wills and special resolution regimes 
should  enable  the  authorities  to  better  handle  the  few  that  are  so  sudden  and 
catastrophic that they are not picked up by the reformed PCA. Yet this is not the 
direction in which the regulatory authorities appear to be moving. In our view, bank 
resolution procedures will remain problematical both in the United States and Europe, 
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